The Ceasefire Agreement
signed by the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam on February 22nd, 2002 is in force.
Any suspension of planned sessions of Peace Talks has no
impact on the validity of the Agreement or the adherence
of the two Parties to the Ceasefire. Both Parties have confirmed
this to Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). SLMM will continue
to monitor the Ceasefire and working on assisting the Parties
in solving disputes that arise and normalizing the situation
in the war torn areas in North and East Sri Lanka.
To prevent future incidents at sea that could threaten
the stability of the Cease Fire, the Sixth Round of Peace
Talks in Japan agreed; “to work out effective arrangements
for the operation of their naval units in keeping with
existing treaty obligations.” The Parties also agreed
that SLMM should; “undertake preventive measures
to avoid serious incidents at sea and on land”.
Recent days have seen strong reactions to isolated points
of the Initial Discussion Paper that SLMM prepared as
a basis for discussion on these arrangements. In that
context SLMM would like to make the following clarifications.
When the Ceasefire Agreement was signed on the 22nd of
Feb 02, the LTTE fighting formations, including the Sea
Tigers, existed. Consequently, the LTTE Sea Tigers exists
as a De Facto Naval Unit. (In the Oxford Advanced Dictionary
“De Facto” is defined as follows: “Existing
as a fact although it may not be legally accepted as existing”).
These are the reasons why SLMM has been tasked to work
out these arrangements. SLMM would like to emphasize that
the LTTE Sea Tigers has neither legal rights nor any legitimate
tasks of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Sri Lanka. These obligations belong purely
to the Forces of the Government of Sri Lanka. Balance
of power is one of the basic elements for the present
Ceasefire. Hence, to maintain their Forces’ capabilities
both Parties must have the right to carry out training
and exercise in designated areas. Such exercises and training
should cause minimum disturbance to the normal life, i.e.
fisheries. In this context it should also be noted that
there are no requirements in the Ceasefire Agreement to
demobilize any of the LTTE military units, including the
LTTE Sea Tigers. Final composition of The Sri Lanka Armed
Forces should be reached at the Peace Talks.
The Initial Discussion Paper was not a legal document,
but a basis for discussion. SLMM has already received
suggestions from both Parties and adjusted the document.
The second draft of proposals has been sent to the Parties,
requesting them to forward their comments to SLMM not
later than 30th April. After that SLMM intends to have
separate discussions with the Parties on these arrangements
and has suggested a meeting between senior naval and political
representatives from both Parties, the Norwegian facilitator
and SLMM at Omantai crossing point on the 7th of May 2003.
SLMM will not and cannot impose any solutions on the Parties,
as all solutions will have to depend on their mutual agreement.
SLMM fully supports a constructive democratic debate on
issues of national concern. However, SLMM discourages
the behaviour of intentionally misinterpreting matters
of sensitive nature and taking them out of context in
order to further a specific political agenda.
Finally it should be reiterated that the role of the
Sri Lanka Navy is clearly stated in article 1.3 of the
Ceasefire Agreement and was also included in the Initial
Discussion Paper on measures for preventing incidents
at sea. From SLMM point of view it is of the utmost importance
that the mechanisms and arrangements specified in any
final arrangements agreed upon must not interfere with
the Sri Lanka Navy’s obligation and legitimate task
of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of Sri Lanka.