In the early hours of Saturday June 14, a suspected LTTE tanker “MT Shoshin” was intercepted by the SLN off the coast of Mullaitivu with a fully-loaded logistic boat on tow. Carrying 12 LTTE cadres on board, the vessel was suspected of transporting weapons. When the SLN contacted the vessel on radio and found that the information provided by it was false, it was ordered to stop. When the vessel failed to heed the instruction, in keeping with the rules of engagement, the SLN craft P-330 fired three warning shots across the bow of the tanker. Around 5.30 in the morning, approximately forty minutes after the engagement, an explosion took place on board the tanker, followed by several secondary explosions, which caused it to sink. The boat on tow escaped before the tanker was engaged by the SLN.

According to the Navy, while the vessel was on fire, it was contacted by the P-330 on Channel 16, to advise the crew to evacuate with the intention of rescuing them. However, this request was not heeded.

In a letter dated June 15, addressed to the Head of the SLMM, Mr Tamilselvan, Head of the Political Wing of the LTTE, alleged that their vessel was intercepted by the SLN in international waters approximately 265 nautical miles off the coast. However, the SLN maintained that the interception took place 175 nautical miles north-east of Mullaitivu, within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Sri Lanka.

Despite the claim of the LTTE that its vessel was in international waters, in terms of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, “a warship, which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than a ship entitled to complete immunity in accordance with Articles 95 and 96, is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that the ship is without nationality”. According to the LTTE, the vessel carried two flags: an LTTE flag and a flag of an undisclosed state of registration. However, the SLN maintains that the LTTE tanker provided incorrect information on radio regarding its identification and country of registration. Moreover, the LTTE failed to provide information on the port of departure, port of call, and other relevant information to establish the fact that MT Shoshin was indeed a merchant vessel as claimed by them.

The conclusions and recommendations outlined by the SLMM in the report are as follows.

Conclusions


a. Both parties did not inform SLMM in due time about the incident. Consequently, SLMM was not in a position to monitor the event and the possibility to prevent the escalation was missed.

b. The fate of the crew of the tanker is unknown to SLMM. SLMM has found no evidence that the crew was captured by SLN.

c. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10th Dec 1982 SLN had the right to inspect the LTTE tanker. Hence, SLMM does not consider that SLN violated the CFA by intercepting the LTTE tanker.

d. LTTE violated the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea of 10th Dec 1982 not flying an appropriate flag and official, visible identification.

Recommendations


a. Naval vessels with electronic log should save the data recorded during an incident and not erase the data before it has been examined by SLMM.
Likewise, all logged information should be saved and made available for SLMM.

b. GOSL and the LTTE should as soon possible reach an agreement on measures to prevent clashes at sea as earlier proposed by SLMM.

c. SLN and LTTE should inform SLMM immediately when there are indications of a possible confrontation.

d. LTTE should instruct its merchant sailors to adhere to United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10th Dec 1982.