On 12 April 2006, the LTTE carried out a bomb attack at a public market in Trincomalee, an ethnically mixed town. The market was crowded at the time, filled with civilians of all ethnic groups preparing for the upcoming New Year celebrations, a time of great significance to the people. An Improvised Explosive Device (IED) fixed to a bicycle was detonated in the market, which was predominated by Sinhala stallholders. The detonation, triggered by a remote controlled device, killed one solider, four civilians and injured five civilians. This indiscriminate bombing of civilians, bearing all the hallmarks of the LTTE bombing campaign of recent weeks, was a clear act of terrorism, which provoked enraged mobs to run rampage resulting in the deaths of 10 civilians and injuries to 45 civilians, many of them critically. The total deaths included 7 Sinhalese, 5 Tamils, 2 Muslims and 1 unidentified individual.

Suggestions have been made that the Government of Sri Lanka has failed to respond adequately to mob attacks that took place in Trincomalee on 12 April 2006.

We note the following:


Immediate Action Taken

• The Army Officer in Charge of Security in the Trincomalee town mobilized the troops already positioned in the town to carry out tasks to contain the violence, including: the installation of additional checkpoints, additional foot and mobile patrols, and additional static guards positioned throughout the town, to prevent the violence from spreading. Police and Naval troops also engaged in coordinated action to contain and quell the situation.

• In addition, available troops from all over the Trincomalee district were immediately dispatched to Trincomalee town to buttress the security presence in the affected area.

• On the direction of the President Mahinda Rajapaksa, Senior government officials, including a Cabinet Minister, the Chief Minister of the North-Central Province, the Inspector General of Police (IGP), the Chief of Defense Staff at the Joint Operations Headquarters, and the Commander of the Navy, flew to Trincomalee within hours of the incident to direct control measures, calm the population and urge restraint.

• The mob violence was contained within 3 hours of the LTTE bomb attack.


Direct Steps to Increase Security

• Urgent measures were taken, including the deployment of over 800 additional policemen to strengthen the security situation in Trincomalee.

• The Security Forces increased their presence in Trincomalee by the addition of 9 platoons – approximately 300 troops.

• A dawn to dusk curfew was imposed on the day of the bomb attack, and continued for 4 days.

• The Security Forces also made special arrangements to provide security for all funerals and funeral processions, including clearing of the roads prior to the funeral processions.

• Troops were deployed in every village as static guards to provide additional protection and security to all the people, regardless of ethnicity.


Decisive Measures taken by H.E. the President

• President Mahinda Rajapaksa responded with urgency to the situation in Trincomalee. He immediately requested a high level political and security delegation to be flown to Trincomalee to ensure that the violence is contained and the problems of those affected addressed on an urgent basis

• On the instructions of the President, arrangements were made for compensation to be paid to the victims of the violence.

• The President has monitored the situation, and instructed high-ranking officials to take appropriate action to address the needs of the affected people.

• In many of the President’s addresses, he has urged the population to refrain from violence. In his “Address to the Nation” on 25 April 2006, the President made a strong appeal to all people not to take the law into their own hands, and not to be provoked into causing a communal clash between the Sinhalese and the Tamil people.

• The perpetrators of this attack clearly hoped for a widespread ethnic backlash. Due to the actions undertaken by the Government, such a widespread backlash did not eventuate.


Response to Allegations of Inaction by Security Forces

• References have been made to witnesses who had alleged that the Security Forces stood by and watched while the violence was unfolding.

• It is necessary to note that the nature of mob violence is relevant in understanding the response of Security Forces and Police personnel anywhere. Mob violence happens in waves and in an unpredictable manner. Military personnel are not equipped or trained to directly confront incidents of this nature. Instead, the immediate goal is to contain the situation and prevent the violence from spreading, while reinforcements are called in. The measures necessary for this containment were being undertaken in the background, and may have appeared as inaction from the perspective of a civilian or a commentator with a preconceived agenda. However, the fact that action was being taken is evident because the violence was contained within 3 hours.

• In responding to concerns raised about the role of the Security Forces during the violence, the Government is taking steps to enhance the crowd control training provided to the Security Forces and Police.


Role of LTTE

• It is necessary to acknowledge the role that the LTTE played in this violence, by committing a terrorist act: detonating a bomb in a crowded public space. It has been observed, by many sources, that the LTTE is intent on instigating communal violence between Tamil and Sinhala civilians. It is possible that the LTTE or other interested parties, through front organizations of “civilians,” encouraged the violence following the attack.