(1) The Weekly Report mentions that the SLMM was established by the Govt of Sri Lanka together with the LTTE. This is inappropriate as it conveys the impression that the SLMM is responsible to GOSL (& LTTE), and also suggests parity on a scale that is unacceptable given the use the LTTE might make of it. The correct position (according to the SOMA) is that the SLMM was established by the Royal Norwegian Government, albeit as a result of the decision in the Ceasefire agreement between GOSL and the LTTE to set up such a Mission.

(2) The Weekly Report keeps using words such as several and often whereas greater precision would be desirable. In addition the actual incidents cited suggested that such words were inappropriate. SLMM mentioned that reference was also to incidents reported in previous weeks. It was pointed out that then this should be specified, since otherwise the Report suggested that there was a rush of incidents in the particular week under scrutiny. Care was important given the use made by particular elements in the media of the SLMM reports.

(3) In addition, the Summary was selective in its highlighting, and this too was taken advantage of by some elements in the media. SLMM mentioned that they were right now concentrating & remaining fully focused on Para Military groups in the Eastern Region. It was pointed out that then the Summary should mention this concern and that the SLMM was also aware of other dangerous trends even though they did not highlight these. Otherwise the omission of concern about the increasing number of claymore attacks, as well as the assassinations by the LTTE, would create the impression that the SLMM was simply concerned with criticizing the Karuna faction and thereby the government, and was ignoring the loss of life which was the consequence of the LTTE actions. SCOPP however acknowledged that the SLMM had noted these killings in the body of the report, though ignored by elements in the media anxious to criticize the government.

(4) The SLMM so far had not been able to work according to the mandate specified in the CFA, which clearly states that it should ‘take note, monitor the violations and then rectify’. SCOPP granted that this had not been a priority during the early years of the Ceasefire, and that more recently it was not perhaps possible to ensure engagement between the LTTE and GOSL that would address violations, given the massive extent of LTTE violations which previously they had not been required to rectify. However, given the violations by the Karuna faction that the SLMM highlighted, and the possibility of working together with GOSL to adjust these, SCOPP suggested that this provided the SLMM with a unique opportunity to fulfil the more productive part of its mandate. SCOPP therefore suggested that they assist the Government in integrating and rehabilitating the former combatants and bringing them into the mainstream of politics. The Karuna faction, in setting up the TMVP and expressing its anxiety to contest elections, had made clear its anxiety to enter the democratic process, in contrast to the LTTE which had during this same period actually closed down its political wing. The positive approach of some former combatants should therefore be encouraged, since this might also help to convince any democratic elements that remained in the LTTE to abandon terrorism and enter the democratic process as so many former combatants amongst Tamils had already done. SCOPP therefore urged the SLMM to persuade the Norwegian government to respond positively to proposals originating with the Commissioner General for Rehabilitation that had been sent to it for consideration.

Isuri Dharmaratne
Deputy Director – Ceasefire Affairs